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Is The Body of Dance Sexed? 
Randy Martin 
Bodies are in motion. They press against each other tenderly, assertively. 
Sweat collects under the chin, in the curve of the lower back, between breasts. 
Breathing, inhaling the entire space, exhaling to obtain a closer fit. Knee 
pushed into thigh, nape of neck under armpit. Tumbling. Spinning. The head 
swirls while the lower body sinks. Arching off of a hip to dive into the folds 
of the belly. Patterned but never repeated, accretions of rhythm build, surge, 
eddy. Gravity acknowledged, resisted. Space compressed, expanded. Still the 
bodies hurl themselves at one another. Drawn, redrawn, withdrawn, assault. 
Too playful, too serious to privilege either. Too much concentrated in an 
instant to return to, too much of a world in the making not to reclaim. 
Of what activity is this an account? Why might there be any doubt? To 
whom could we address this ambiguity? We have become accustomed, by so 
much intelligent writing of late, to think of the body in terms of sexuality.1 A 
body in motion writes the differences which establish gender. This writing, of 
the body and of texts devoted to it, is indeed seductive. But like any seduction, 
a road taken appears as a totality of choice. 
The Politics of the Real 
That I had in mind dance and not sex as I opened this essay by itself 
resolves nothing. I can hardly invoke some solipsistic priority of interpretation 
against an entire discursive field that has connected the body to sexuality. 
Rather, I would like to explore another activity, dance, that is equally 
contingent upon human relations, to arrive at a bodily practice not contingent 
upon the representation of difference. Far from residing in a world of nature 
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or eternal myth, certain forms of dance have the capacity of pointing to a 
bodily practice that resists the relations of domination and subordination that 
suffuse much human activity, including sexuality. In the complex relations of 
performance these aspects are both concealed and revealed. Sexuality, like 
dance, is fraught with the language of performance. The value of the activity 
is reduced to its measurable attributes. Theatrical performances may be 
measured by their greatness or a moment of climax, but this approach conceals 
the forces necessary to make a performance in the first place. If judgement 
assumes pitting the performance against some ideal standard that lies beyond 
it, then the representation of difference this process demands is wrapped up 
with power. To withhold that urge to judge is to open up the possibility of 
accounting for the activity of performance itself, an activity framed by relations 
of power but not reducible to them. Against these relations lies a different 
value for performance of bodily activity, one that presents the body in use 
against the exchange for power demanded by representation. 
Ultimately, my aims are political. Without denying the profundities of 
sexual oppression or the social transformation made available through the 
project of sexual liberation, I will suggest a distinctive, if not always discrete 
body politics in what follows. My strategy will be to deploy certain dance 
practices to locate a non-sexual bodily activity and to isolate in this activity 
the resources for resisting the divisive demands of certain structures of 
dominance in the world at large. With contemporary identity and political 
struggle so intertwined with these demands, the threat of being consumed by 
the very power one struggles against looms large. Rather than locating the 
register of alternatives in a mythic past or transcendental future, the bodily 
activity discussed here will establish this register of alternatives in the present. 
Specifically, the privileging of certain forms of dance is intended to foreground 
bodily practices present but not apparent in everyday life to indicate where 
oppositional politics can turn to renew its will to resist.2 
Why is it important to locate a body beyond sexuality? Clearly the body 
is a presence in every domain of human practice: production, reproduction, 
consumption, reception. If sexuality did determine all bodily activity, if from 
Wilhelm Reich3 we accepted that sexual energy both lies at the core of and 
drives human practice, then it seems that we would be dependent on a 
fundamentally essentialist account of humanity. Essentialist accounts tend to 
fetter the range of possible changes in human behavior to a conception of an 
intractable nature, and, by so doing, limit an appreciation of people's capacity 
to fashion society or make history. From this essentialist vantage, history itself 
would be the drive toward the liberation of a particular energy always 
derivative of sexuality. Yet if history has a primeval source, its ends are likely 
to be visible in its origins, and its prospects for transformation would seem to 
be severely compromised. That is to say, the demise of exploitation, 
domination or suppression would appear as the fulfillment of some ends 
planted with the origin of the species, and as such, rooted in some biological 
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or natural human state of being that actual groups of people have no control 
over. Just as some political theater might aspire to figure possibilities not 
apparent to its audience, or lift the inexorability of oppression with an 
uncertain ending,4 so too are social movements served by a sense of the 
indeterminacy of their historical future. Essentializing sexuality not only 
confines history to the realization of some predetermined end or telos, but 
assures the perpetuation of the very difference supposedly responsible for 
domination. Monique Wittig has argued that such a position is ultimately an 
argument for heterosexuality rather than the elimination of a domination based 
upon gender. "By admitting that there is a 'natural' division between women 
and men, we naturalize history, we assume that men and women have always 
existed and will always exist. Not only do we naturalize history, but also 
consequently we naturalize the social phenomena which express our oppression 
making change impossible."5 
While it is difficult to imagine the grounds for a proof of some ontological 
sexual difference, it is impossible to establish any "empirical" criteria that could 
concretely and discretely divide the human population into distinguishable, 
mutually exclusive sets of men and women. Any line drawn between the two 
on putatively objective grounds is effaced almost immediately upon inspection. 
For example, reproduction, which has been historically associated with those 
called women, could never serve as a minimal definition not simply because it 
is acquired and lost, but because there are many with the appellation woman 
who never acquire this capacity. That women do not necessarily have the 
capacity to bear children is further complicated by recent developments in 
biomedical technology which render reproduction independent of sex and 
therefore outside of any human body.6 We also know from the literature on 
so-called transsexuals that there exist no genetic, hormonal or physiognomic 
breaks among many individuals that would concretely identify them as male or 
female. While most beings cluster around certain characteristics, such as XX 
or XY chromosomes, in actuality there are a whole range of chromosomal 
permutations in between (to say nothing of cases where clear XX or XY 
chromosomes yield unexpected secondary sex characteristics).7 At a certain 
point in their development, these individuals are pressed by doctors, family and 
friends to choose gender preferences ironically turning a condition of choice 
into a predicament of misplaced identification. Statements such as, "Genital 
ambiguity in a newborn represents a true medical emergency," seem as 
representative of the anxiety such "disorders" provoke in the medical profession 
as they are indicative of the cruel gendered world that "medical and surgical 
treatment" will protect the improperly differentiated neonate from.8 Further, 
those who can "choose" submit their bodies to a manipulation only slightly 
greater (in the form of surgical moldings of the body, hormonal and other 
injections and behavior trainings) than those who enter the world with a choice 
applied to them.9 
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The point in all of this is that real human bodies do not announce their 
sexual differences, they must be articulated through a set of distinctions and 
oppositions that are already in place long before a given member of the species 
is born. The invocation of biological determinants of gender does however 
serve ideological ends—even in non-western cultures where no "scientific" 
language of biology exists. As anthropologist Bridget O'Laughlin observes in 
her work on the Mbum Kpau of southwestern Chad: That which is arbitrary 
and contradictory (a reflection of women's subordination to men) is defined 
as biologically determined. . . ."10 
If indeed, "one is not born a woman" as Simone de Beauvoir11 and 
Monique Wittig suggest, and we can allow no essential difference to assign 
gender, we must examine the social processes of associating body and gender. 
As in Saussurean linguistics, this relation of signifier and signified is an 
arbitrary one. Words are attached to meanings only through the association 
of sounds with concepts by a community of speakers. Saussure goes to lengths 
to show that there is no word, even in the case of so-called onomatopoeia, that 
is intrinsically linked to a meaning.12 Word sounds or signifiers are not 
motivated by the concepts they represent. Rather, meaning as a symbolic 
order is constructed socially by a given community of speakers. A speaking 
person does not exist prior to language, that is to say, the individual identity 
rests upon the social. Individual speakers have little latitude in inventing 
particular signs, they must accept the given authority of the sign (what linguists 
refer to as the zero degree of language)13 to attain any fluency or freedom as 
a speaker. In this regard, the acquisition of language is the means through 
which acting persons, or subjects, attain consciousness, not only of others, but 
of themselves as well. 
It is upon these linguistic insights that a re-reading of the Freudian theory 
of sexuality has taken place, notably by the late French analyst Jacques Lacan 
and especially by the feminists who have critiqued and developed his work. 
Lacan's work is notoriously dense but extremely suggestive for an appreciation 
of the construction of sexuality through linguistic operations, and, for what lies 
outside sexuality but upon which it none the less depends. Lacan's appropria-
tion of Saussure understands not only conscious activity but also the uncon-
scious, to be structured as a language. He replaces what are often read as 
conflicting dimensions of experience contained within the individual~the 
Freudian terms superego, ego, and id-with mutually interwoven but non-
reducible social registers. These he defines as the symbolic (the authority 
principle where differences are regulated through language), the imaginary 
(where the subject tries to unify and make sense with the pre-ordered world 
of difference) and the real (that which anchors the first two but remains 
unrepresentable). The body itself lies in the real. It is "irreducible" to 
language and likewise, "there is nothing in the unconscious which accords with 
the body."14 The real is equivalent to what Saussure calls the referent, the 
actual thing or object a sign stands in for, hence the absence of lack. This is 
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precisely how Lacan defines the real and against which he discusses sexual 
difference. In the words of Jacqueline Rose, who has brought a feminist 
Lacanian view of sexuality to an English-speaking audience: 
Sexual difference is then assigned according to whether 
individual subjects do or do not possess the phallus, which means 
not that anatomical difference is sexual difference (the one as strictly 
deducible from the other), but that anatomical difference comes to 
figure sexual difference, that is, it becomes the sole representative of 
what that difference is allowed to be. It thus covers over the 
complexity of the child's early sexual life with a crude opposition in 
which that very complexity is refused or repressed. The phallus thus 
indicates the reduction of difference to an instance of visible 
perception, a seeming value. . . . What counts is not the perception 
but its already assigned meaning—the moment therefore belongs in 
the symbolic.15 
Here we see how the real (phallus) becomes figured as missing and this figure 
is assigned an already given meaning in the culturally established order of the 
symbolic to construct a difference that the real itself could not register. For 
this reason there is no sexuality outside the symbolic and as Rose says, "there 
is no feminine outside language."16 The political consequence Rose and others 
rightly draw is that the struggle against patriarchal domination must be waged 
upon the terrain of cultural representation, it cannot be grounded upon a 
conception of the feminine body and its natural or essential difference or 
privilege. As she puts it, "If the status of the phallus is to be challenged, it 
cannot, therefore, be directly from the feminine body but must be by means 
of a different symbolic term (in which case the relation to the body is 
immediately thrown into crisis), or else by an entirely different logic altogether 
(in which case one is no longer in the order of symbolisation at all)."17 While 
Rose and others have focused on this "different symbolic term," the "entirely 
different logic altogether" also demands attention. This is precisely the project 
I would like to indicate here, for without a politics of the real, the referent for 
the crisis that Rose invokes would all but disappear. 
Welcome to the Dance 
What can be said for psychoanalysis often holds for performance as well. 
Performance is temptingly viewed wholly within the purview of the symbolic, 
as a representation that invites the question, "what does this mean?" While 
this question clarifies much, it does not explain how a performer survives the 
authority of author, director, choreographer, composer, to enact a perfor-
mance, any more than the analysis of the symbolic accounts for the real. 
Precisely those dance forms that are most abstract, least representational, tend 
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to resist the question of the symbolic. Some of these also resist aligning dance 
and gender roles. The significance of the break with gender based presenta-
tion and technique is to move this discussion of dance from the realm of the 
symbolic to that of the real. It points to the capacity denied in the symbolic 
realm of production, a body capable of constructing its conditions of pos-
sibility, that is, a body as agent of history. This it would seem is what is 
ultimately at stake in posing the question "is the body of dance sexed?" 
Without pretending anything of the status or closure of an answer, I would 
like to continue problematizing the field of bodily practice as a politics of the 
real made available through the analysis of non-representational dance that 
effaces gendered difference. 
Certainly one could not claim that all dance is asexual. Indeed, much 
dance rests on a symbolic that acknowledges and affirms sexual difference. 
We could speak of a dance vocabulary that attempts to portray basic énergie 
drives of eros and thanatos, such as Martha Graham's, or more technically of 
a lexicon grounded upon a sexual division of labor such as the relations of 
partnering in ballet. The dance of Broadway and Hollywood musicals often 
synthesizes both these elements into pedagogical tools for archetypal narratives 
of heterosexuality. Yet much recent dance has turned from these premises 
and offers a practice of bodily physicality whose difference is internal to the 
dance itself. 
It is worthwhile to distinguish the what and the how of dancing in this 
context as there are choreographic forms that eliminate the representation of 
sexual difference without eroding the physical relations upon which it is based. 
The work of Alwin Nikolais is exemplar}7 here. Nikolais, a disciple of Hanya 
Holm, herself heir to the tradition of German dance expressionist Mary 
Wigman, has in over forty years of output, consistently undermined a gendered 
reading of bodies in motion. He has accomplished this by featuring motion 
itself as subject. By masking the body as such within a theater of light, sound 
and objects, the viewer is invited to perceive not persons dancing but purely 
formal physical and kinetic qualities—much as abstractionists from Malevich to 
Pollock have achieved with visual form. While gender differences are not 
represented in many of Nikolais's works, the movements of dancers concealed 
in bags, bathed in black light, or seemingly suspended on stands and stools 
invisible to the audience are facilitated by the traditional balletic relations of 
men lifting women. Clearly this is not the case in every dance or every 
movement, but it is a technical basis that runs throughout the work. This is 
particularly emblematic of gender because it physically assumes women as the 
weaker vessel and because it literally displays women's assent as contingent on 
male support. Here the technical underpinnings of dance are still being 
approached through the register of the symbolic despite the absence of a 
descriptive narrative. 
Far from being immune to broader cultural conjunctures, dance can be 
seen as an embodiment of social contradictions. Without an essence to define 
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it, the body must be historicized and the development of dance makes this 
history available. In this development I am reading a capacity for non-
gendered practice that emerges and grows through the twentieth century. 
While some have seen a cultural "break" in the last quarter century and 
identified it as a turn to the postmodern,18 the modernist impulse in dance 
has evidenced a greater degree of continuity than rupture. 
The rediscovery of the pedestrian, focused on the Judson Church dancers 
of the 1960's, is at times associated with postmodernism in dance. Ironically 
this had nothing to do with the celebration of dead styles that characterizes 
other postmodernisms nor has the pedestrian impulse and the audience 
concern that accompanies it ever been absent from modern dance in its brief 
history. One might suggest that Loie Fuller anticipates Nikolais or Robert 
Wilson in her use of technics to construct a space of performance that 
envelops audience in pure motion, and Isadora Duncan prefigures Martha 
Graham and Twyla Tharp in a turn to "great Western traditions" that feature 
performer as a myth of self. 
If the sixties did not generate a new esthetic in dance,19 it did see a burst 
in technical devices that could be the basis for genuinely non-gendered 
dancing. The use of weight and momentum of bodies rolling against one 
another, what developed into contact improvisation, had the potential to 
eliminate gender-based partnering. Size and strength were submerged to 
release and flow of body motion. The omnipotent potential for domination 
that the former two might represent were replaced by the kinetics and 
sentience that the latter two demanded. Yet despite the fact that these 
techniques could effectively eliminate a practice of dancing that would depict 
sexual difference, the techniques themselves could not terminate a will to 
represent such difference. Pilobolus borrowed heavily from this technique to 
make a series of dances that rely on a gender play that ultimately affirms 
heterosexuality. Men support women under long dresses, one fused man-
woman chasing the other in a lust for what lies within. The interior marriage 
of male and female bodies becomes the necessary affirmation of any exterior 
desire. 
The development that this new dance technique made available could be 
compared to other much heralded technological breakthroughs of the fifties 
and sixties. For example, that automation, cybernetics and computer-based 
technologies had the capacity to remove direct physical subordination of body 
to machine that had characterized the industrial revolution is not in doubt. 
Potentially, continuous flow work processes could enable workers to supervise 
machines. Ethnographic accounts of advanced technologies tell us otherwise. 
Continuous flow chemical plants deploy labor in the dirtiest and most menial 
physical tasks.20 Service sector work demands a repetition of gesture and 
speech ("Have a nice day," "Have it your way," "Coffee?") that assumes bodily 
form is itself a product in an otherwise automated environment that has no 
productive use for living labor. In short, labor is all the more subordinated to 
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machines as the latter gain in complexity, rather than that complexity providing 
greater worker input to the deployment of labor. 
That the capacity to emancipate the body as living labor is not realized 
under capitalism speaks to the very dialectic of technology that Marx made 
plain. Capitalism, that most progressive and barbaric of historical forms 
socializes as it denies the collective import of that socialization.21 Dance relies 
on no such progressivistic a history. The modernist demands for innovation 
appear in dance in myriad forms which may intensify or dissipate the 
socialization of the body. The convergence we find in the sixties between 
dance and society is of productive techniques which incorporate ever higher 
degrees of surveillance of output while commanding but a part of the body 
(e.g. fingers for the whole in word processing, eyes in chemical manufacture) 
and dance techniques that speak to the body that would, under different 
conditions be freed by these technologies. The dance techniques however, do 
not depend upon a subordination of subject to object in order to produce an 
artifact. It is the exceptional dance that subordinates person to stage prop and 
even here the prop is often an extension of the body. Rather, dance techni-
ques allow a sensual being to act upon material space in ways that feature the 
body as subject. While these techniques do not always free the body from 
some subjugation to gender, they are pre-eminently labor intensive. 
The Figuration of Dance in Society 
Without forgetting that a technical break cannot by itself overcome the 
relations into which it is inserted, we can explore some concrete practices of 
dance that develop without gender difference. It is not that they never 
succumb to the symbolic, or the technics of gender difference, rather, that they 
provide a ground for resistance to these. There are also methodological 
problems that emerge when one attempts to privilege a particular form or 
instance of art. Clearly there is no simple reflection of society in art.22 But it 
is possible to use art as a lens with which to examine society. Here, one wants 
to invest the work of art with something it could not possibly bear as a single 
instance of practice, that is, the totality of relations that would make possible 
a history. Fredric Jameson has encouraged us to identify this Utopian moment 
in the text, and to show how that moment corresponds to and is situated within 
multiple levels of social significance from its particularity to a "master 
narrative" of history (the four levels Jameson borrows from medieval Christian 
allegory via Northrop Frye are literal, formal, mythical and anagogical.)23 
Jameson's model seems to presume a paradigm of culture as representa-
tion. That paradigm may fit the novel and even film (Jameson's preferred 
objects of analysis), but it is far from clear that the dance which emerges from 
the sixties is fruitfully viewed through the prism of representation. Indeed, this 
dance which produces movement that does not stand for anything but the 
activity of the body itself, cannot accurately be considered a sign.24 If the body 
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is not formed into a set of signifiers which are associated with an array of 
signifieds, (as is most strongly apparent in symbolically narrative forms such 
as Balinese dance) then it is difficult to identify it as a socially symbolic act, 
the way Jameson does for the texts he studies. When dance eludes the register 
of the symbolic, it falls into that "entirely different logic" that Jacqueline Rose 
alluded to, the real. For much choreography, a concept cannot be fit to any 
specific movement image; its effects are viscerally kinetic. It is even less clear 
that the body follows other linguistic conventions of syntax, semantics, rhetoric 
and so forth. Where movement does not correspond to an idea, where dance 
does not rest on an already given hierarchy of meaning (such as that ordered 
by the phallus), the use of linguistic or semiotic analysis can lead to a 
misrecognition. It is precisely this misrecognition that makes the real so 
elusive and purely abstract dance disconcerting for many. 
Perhaps for this reason the appellation of postmodernism so weakly 
applies to dance. In a brief essay reminiscent of Lacan's intensity, Jameson 
names two aspects of postmodernism, pastiche and schizophrenia.25 Pastiche, 
the blank parody of now dead styles, refers to the shattering of the myth of the 
modernist genius whose profound experience of individualism produces artistic 
innovation. Schizophrenia, indicates the split, or disarticulation of image and 
meaning such that signifier and signified lose their association in a seamless 
surface of images. Here, the body's resistance to the entire register of the 
symbolic (that is when the real of the body is in motion) makes it difficult to 
speak of pastiche (though the work of critically exalted Mark Morris certainly 
fits the rubric of reviving dead styles) and the absence of an appeal to meaning 
renders problematic the surface of signifiers split from their signifieds that 
defines schizophrenia. 
Here dance, among all the arts, presents a rather distinctive puzzle. If 
tools as powerful as the ones Jameson provides somehow cannot account for 
dance, and accounts of dance have so successfully resisted contemporary theory 
such as Jameson's, then the gap between theory and practice that appears so 
exceptional in dance must itself be taken seriously as a conceptual problem.26 
Left at this apparent impasse, what analytic devices can be employed to 
appreciate the social and political dimensions of the real practices of the body? 
The play of physicality and abstraction can be found as frequently in 
music as in dance (although in music the physicality of the body is transformed 
into sound). Music theory is therefore a likely ally in the effort to grasp the 
sociality of dance. Closer perhaps to providing a lived Utopia for the body is 
Jacques Attali's analysis of music, Noise, which fits particular musical forms 
into the conditions of their production and reproduction through the elabora-
tion of codes. The codes have a synchronic and diachronic dimension, they 
exist simultaneously yet one is always hegemonic. In the emerging code one 
can identify evidence of social structures in anticipation. Because contradic-
tions that will play themselves out over long periods of time are easily 
condensed in music, it can be used to read the future. It strikes me that music 
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may not be alone in this capacity. Attali, like Jameson, is giving us another 
Utopian model for art. Attali takes seriously the physical, non-symbolic 
contours of art at the same time that he grounds Utopia as but a partiality of 
the present. Unlike Jameson's texts which contain the future, Attali's codes 
announce or point toward it. His four codes more or less trace the rise and 
fall of capitalism. Anterior to the capitalist mode is sacrifice, akin to what 
Walter Benjamin might call art as ritual.28 Here, music simulates the violence 
that gives authority to power. As artists are cast out from the courts and the 
instrumentality of performance and power is disrupted, the prospect of the 
professional spectacle is generated. The professional concert, which corn-
modifies music, anticipates the more generalized exchange of the market. To 
preserve the authenticity of the great performance, the technology of recording 
is applied to music. The repetition that recording makes available, structures 
musical form as epitomized in the fragmented and reconstructed Muzak. The 
centralization of the means of musical reproduction excludes certain emergent 
forms. Further, it is precisely those forms most resistant to fragmentation that 
establish an opposition to the reification of music found in the repetitive code. 
Free jazz is Attali's archetype of the new code. Because this music is both 
self-produced on the musicians' own record labels and it is made under 
conditions of live improvisation with each musician contributing to the 
conception and execution of the product, this emergent code is named 
composition. 
The decade since Noise was published has seen the waning of free jazz. 
The labels and venues of the music have succumbed to the same forces that 
have bankrupted other small businesses. There are other forms that fit the 
rubric of composition. In music, one thinks of punk in San Francisco and Los 
Angeles in the late seventies when it was still self-produced music. The loft 
or downtown dance scene in New York that blossomed in the wake of Judson 
Church also fits. Like free jazz, performances were self-produced and 
grounded in improvisational techniques. Improvisation here is not simply 
random or unstructured behavior but rather kinetic responses to choreographic 
problems or predicaments. Examples of such problems might be: move on all 
fours, dance without use of arms, maintain bodily contact with other dancers, 
or, in so called free improvisation, the shared history of these problems 
weighing against the dancers' present. Because the response exceeds the 
boundaries of the problem the resultant movement appears as a surprise or as 
something spontaneous. For the dancer, this sequence of surprises is a 
renewal of physical predicaments that continue to generate movement. 
For the viewers, the accretion of kinetic choices is patterned into then-
own bodies as a totalizing physical experience or sentience. Dance drawn from 
improvisation is vulnerable to the same market vagaries as free jazz, yet it has 
persisted nonetheless perhaps because it rests on the earlier representative 
code and can never be fully assimilated as repetition. Loft dancing has not 
yielded to mechanical reproduction where the copy eclipses the original as a 
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jazz performance might be elided by compact disc. While the dancing on 
MTV signals the body as sex precisely by fragmenting the image of moving 
dancers and broadcasting to the viewer where to look, improvisational 
performance is not nearly so helpful in assisting viewers with their reception. 
From the other side of the divide of repetition, it is a familiar complaint to be 
heard from dancers, that learning movement from a video is frustrating 
because the reproduced image tends to flatten the qualitative dynamics of the 
motion and keeps the way the movement could actually be produced a secret. 
Dance, like revolution follows no ontological linearity of development. 
It too, can "skip" codes as "stages" of development in part because it can 
maintain its marginality. The esotericism of compositional dance protects it 
from fragmentation (SONY does not seem to be terribly interested in 
producing loft dance concerts) and frees it to maintain a play of popular and 
quotidian pedestrian forms with the technical operations we associate in the 
West with art. Ultimately then, dance like any other art form is ambivalent. 
The very conditions that might make it resistant to repetition also remove it 
from mass or popular consumption. This is the predicament Marcuse 
identifies for the avant-garde.29 What makes compositional dance different is 
that it is grounded in the quotidian practices of the body freed from their 
pedestrian functionality. Hence dance serves not as a simulacrum of revolu-
tion but as a condensation of social relations that would be necessary for 
certain liberations, specifically of gender and of labor. 
Rechristened compositional dance, downtown, loft dancing (I resist the 
term postmodern because it assumes a unity of something other than 
conditions of production for these dancers and it pronounces a set of esthetic 
criteria-pastiche and schizophrenia-that are particularly ill-fitted to dance) 
displays certain features of a non-gendered or otherwise dominated bodily 
practice. While the tendency to reduplicate an esthetic unity through the 
construction of an artistic mode of production is a real danger that makes my 
own comments suffer from the problems of those analyses I have critiqued, the 
gain of prefiguring the possibility of an undominated bodily practice seems 
worth the price. Further, in attempting to define a domain of ungendered 
practice I am not arguing against sex but against those particular orders of 
difference that render sex always the subjugation of one body to another. This 
maneuver rests not simply upon a reordering of the symbolic, but on a fuller 
incorporation of the possibilities which emanate from the real into the 
practices of pleasure. 
For this to be possible it must be made plain that not all bodily practices 
are organized by some singular symbolic order (centered by and on the 
phallus) and that the body retains a reality that is more multiple than a 
totalizing notion of domination would allow. A last caveat. If the body resists 
the symbolic it need not be because it contains some transcendental essence 
that cannot be represented. In rejecting the absolute and resolute character 
of the symbolic, we do not necessarily arrive back at the biological (though this 
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is a turn that could be taken). Rather, compositional dance reveals what is 
often misrecognized in other forms. It is a practice that is always constructed, 
willfully, patiently, often against some commonsensical corporeal knowledge 
to locate a realm of the senses. While available in everyday life (because the 
dancer's body shares with the pedestrian's a history of repression of love and 
labor, desire and demand) such dance privileges that practice of opposition 
that would render the body a subject whose agency is conjuncturally defined. 
Dance constructs a body that moves without a myth of nature. It moves by 
and for an encounter with another in a space that equally is artificially 
bounded. The improvisational basis for compositional dance presents the body 
fashioning history out of the socially given performance space. 
Bodies in Composition 
The work of the compositional dancers opposes gendered difference in 
at least three important aspects. First, it is an exploration of motion that 
resists the symbolic. With many exceptions, (I am exploring a tendency not 
imposing an empirical absolute) these dances do not tell stories, let alone 
fables of difference between men and women. If there is a narrative, it is 
kinetic and not meaningful. This is difficult to assert on paper. Writing 
implicates its object in a process of signification. All that is available to me is 
to point out the limits of the signifiable. Any proof must be found where the 
page is not. Perhaps this can be problematized by moving your arm up and 
down as you read this. Beyond this motion emanating from a verbal directive 
it is an activity that represents nothing other than its motional value. In 
compositional dance, it is the verbal directive itself that is absented. Clearly 
someone may stand outside an improvisation and direct it. But these verbal 
commands are reactive to the ongoing condition of bodies in motion, they may 
set parameters for physical interaction but they do not generate movement. 
Remember that the problems and predicaments that constitute improvisation 
are themselves physical in nature. What these non-symbolic narratives present 
is a physical history, in this case, the body as agent of social activity. This 
activity is social because a dance performance is a collective and collaborative 
artifice, it presents a history because the kinetic narrative makes sense of a 
possibility implicit in the pedestrian body, the possibility of intentionally 
constructing time and space. 
Second, compositional dance undermines the sexual division of labor that 
yields a technique of gendered difference. Drawing from contact improvisation 
and its discontents, ways of movement are found that undermine and redefine 
bodily co-manipulations. Women lift, throw, trip, roll, tumble, stop, push, 
other men and women. They fit snugly and loosely, chase and are pursued, 
generate intimacies and distances among those others that otherwise share a 
relation to the symbolic. What is to keep a viewer from reading these actions 
in terms of the symbolic? One can offer no guarantees. It is often clear that 
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these bodily relations do not result in anything that might be mistaken for sex. 
That is why some critics have labeled some dance composers "playful" and 
"childlike," testimony that the movement has successfully resisted the symbolic. 
For the dancers, who display possibilities for our own practice, it can be said 
that their flesh is not presented as an object for the gaze (modern dance 
especially has been accused of being anti-erotic), but rather, their practice 
subjectivizes the body as motion, which can be grasped only as a relation. 
Third, the dancers, like the musicians in free jazz, all compose, collabora-
tively and collectively. This is true not only in improvised performances which 
depend on a shared responsibility for crafting the event. It is also the case 
where improvisation is used to generate movement that will then be set into 
a particular dance. Gone is the choreographer who conceives in advance what 
the dancers will do and tries to mold them to an idea. If there is a choreog-
rapher, she is more editor than director, responsible for assemblage and 
distribution and not production. Such a division of labor would make many 
workers happy. 
Much dance performed in downtown Manhattan is composed through 
non-symbolic, non-gendered and collective performance. One group of 
dancers, Eccentric Motions, organized by Pooh Kaye, that I have tracked 
consistently since 1983, closely realizes these three resistances. If you will 
permit me to exchange my partisanship for your interest, I can perhaps make 
this clearer and conclude with what they might offer to a bodily practice 
beyond the dance. Eccentric Motions explores a kinetic narrative based on the 
appropriation of pedestrian movement to an elaborated technique. The other 
to this technique is the built environment itself. More properly, the basis for 
their movement might be considered meta-pedestrian, for it utilizes physical 
actions such as crawling or springing onto the tops of feet that might be 
abandoned locomotions, roads not taken, in the kinetics of everyday life. 
Rather than having roots in the history of dance, these movements and 
movement devices are rooted in a negation of the upright, work-world 
orientation of the body. Sitting and standing as postures of labor are opposed 
to perversions and corruptions of the static subordination to an object that 
these postures might entail. Added to this extension of the pedestrian is a 
nieans of partnering focused only on available bodies. Proximity does not 
discriminate by sex. Women lift women, snap at each other's toes, trip men, 
who are entitled to respond in kind. There is no physical marking of their 
bodies which delimits or separates dancerly activity. 
While the pedestrian is utilized as a grounds for movement, it is 
decontextualized to the point where the viewer is drawn into the kinetic 
context generated by the unfolding dance rather than some symbolic referent 
to what lies outside it. While this break is never total, it tends to undermine 
the symbolic by denying it a logic in difference. Movements and proximities 
that might be sanctioned in everyday life are rendered acceptable to the viewer 
through the improvisational or compositional quality that remains in the work. 
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Exceeding the limits of a problem effects the surprise which can begin to build 
a history within the actual time in which the dance takes place. Finally, 
composition is given a unique take with the Eccentrics through the structure 
of the "wild field" (also the name of a signature piece). The wild field is a 
rupture from the internal order generated by the dance. It is a moment of 
collective improvisation so densely laced with movement as to efface the 
singularity of a dancer's body into a kinetic wash. The illusion for the viewer 
is the shift from individual dancers in coordinated motion to a totalizing 
motion of a social body. The dancers do not fuse through repetition or 
number but rather by exceeding the boundaries of their additive individual 
outputs. The field then extends beyond the performing area to spill with the 
audience, onto the street. 
While dance generates a Utopia for the body, it is a Utopia always 
grounded in the real. As impossible as the Eccentric Motions may be to 
mimic, the sensation of motion overflowing boundaries as a collective product 
is itself what is suffused through the public. To insert the Utopian as a lived 
connection to the real is to link two mutually unrepresentable forces into a 
single practice. The gendered body is always subordinated to the symbolic that 
would give it meaning. The body of dance imposes on the pedestrian the 
conditions for the latter's rupture of the symbolic. Yet dance does not invent 
this possibility. If we think of the body always in sexual terms, this reveals 
something of our mechanisms of thought and not necessarily of bodily practice. 
If dance makes this practice available under conditions which are social 
(sentience of the dependence of bodies) and historical (structuring future 
predicaments by acting on those in the present) then we need not become 
dancers to realize its possibility. 
Conclusion: Incorporating the Real 
Compositional dance presents the logic of the real in its production and 
reception. As performance, it reveals bodies acting not under the demand of 
symbolization or the urge to create meaningful representations, but in pursuit 
of their possibilities as bodies. If the distinctiveness of this performance form 
is to retain any resonance beyond this essay, then the gain of moving from a 
politics of the symbolic to that of the real must be indicated. 
The real body does not move outside of or prior to culture but through 
it, by presenting the physical conditions it acts upon as the conditions of its 
own possibility. This is the body in composition that moves without a myth of 
nature. The denaturalization of the body separates out what appears as 
necessity, the absolute authority of an established order of gender. From this 
it is possible to historicize what was previously taken as given and thereby 
expand the horizon of what can be grist for social change. When what had 
been considered natural is refigured as social, the emphasis is placed on a 
world susceptible to human agency, rather than human agency fettered to 
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something inert. As such, the real acts to expand the sense of possibility for 
social change. This sense of possibility is particularly critical in a conjuncture 
where claims have been made that we have already reached the zenith of the 
historical horizon. Rather than representing history as having reached its 
conclusion, we would experience the historical as that expansion of our own 
sense of possibility. 
More than expanding the sense of the possible, the politics of the real 
continually places symbolic politics into activity and rest. This placement 
delivers a residence for the symbolic and a space unencumbered by the 
demands of the linguistic laws of the symbolic which threaten to exhaust all 
resistance. Hence in Lacanian terms, the real phallus only stands in the 
symbolic when called upon to represent difference, otherwise, it dissolves back 
into the real. This movement in and out of the symbolic relieves the subject 
of the constant demands of sexuality. The subject is re-engaged with a world 
more complex than that pre-figured by the symbolic and may thereby draw 
upon alternative relations. Sexuality aside, while symbols provide templates for 
knowing the world, they are deeply enmeshed in repression and domination. 
Refiguring the symbolic is critical to virtually all projects of human emancipa-
tion if we are to identify ourselves in terms that do not reproduce the very 
categories by which we are divided. Yet without featuring the real as a 
domain of the absence of lack, a new set of distinctions ordered in the 
symbolic can easily introduce other scarcities that depend on all too familiar 
dynamics of power. The discussion of compositional dance offered here, 
featured the real analytically. It remains for actual social movements to 
incorporate the real into the ways they conceptualize their practices in order 
to facilitate their performance of politics. 
This turns the discussion to the question of performance itself. If 
oppositional politics must redl-ize its performative moment in order to 
transform its conditions of struggle, so must performance theory real-ize what 
lies beyond the symbolic in order to account for actual activity on stage. It is 
the realization of the body's possibility that might most fruitfully account for 
theatrical presence on stage. If the participants in performance conceive of 
their activity exclusively as a symbolic one, than the invisible underpinnings 
that support the flow of signification on stage will go unappreciated. By 
viewing performance only as representation, that which anchors performance 
is lost to the analysis. 
The body is all too often conceived of as a sign. This symbolic maneuver 
intended to illuminate the social significance of the body, also conceals its 
presence as a referent. While performers act as a medium of exchange for the 
performance text, be it script, score, or choreographic steps (such that, by the 
end of a show, an audience can feel that it got its money's worth), those same 
performers retain what they produced in use, the real of their bodies. The 
capacity to enact with others upon a stage is preserved by the performers for 
another night. What the critic, the scholar, the audience, may have perceived 
during the performance might be accounted for wholly within the register of 
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the symbolic. An appreciation of the real in compositional dance would 
perhaps tell them otherwise. 
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